ChamelIoT: An Agnostic Operating System Framework for Reconfigurable IoT Devices

M. Silva, S. Pinto, and T. Gomes

Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) is revolutionizing the Internet of the future by connecting billions of smart devices over a massive and collaborative network infrastructure. Operating systems for the 'things' play a vital role in the IoT ecosystem, by providing a set of services and abstractions which eases the development and speedups the deployment of IoT solutions at scale. However, the myriad of available solutions is not yet ready to fully explore the potential and flexibility of modern reconfigurable devices. This letter proposes ChamellIoT, an agnostic operating system framework for reconfigurable IoT devices.

Index Terms—Internet-of-Things (IoT), reconfigurable devices, hardware security, low-power, embedded systems. ADD KEY-WORDS

I. INTRODUCTION

The Internet of Things (IoT) is connecting myriads of devices to the Internet. While early concerns were related to the connectivity and interoperability of devices, the nowadays focus comprises security and privacy issues. For such systems, a variety of security architectures have been proposed, mainly relying on software-based isolation and virtualization [1,2]. The addition of hardware virtualization extensions in ARM and Intel processors brought a set of hardware-assisted virtualization solutions [3,4] with reduced trusted computing base (TCB) complexity and significant performance advantages. Notwithstanding, hypervisors are not, per se, magic bullets, and they have been struggling with their own security problems [5]. In this sense, hypervisors must be complemented with other security-oriented technologies that guarantee security from the outset. Secure processor architectures, such as ARM TrustZone and Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX), have found widespread applicability on the high- and middle-end sector. ARM TrustZone has been attracting a lot of attention due to the massive presence of ARM application processors in the mobile and embedded segments. At the heart of the TrustZone stands the concept of secure and nonsecure worlds, completely hardware-isolated, with non-secure software prevented from directly accessing secure resources. A lot of research has been steamed by TrustZone, ranging from trusted execution environment (TEE) kernels and services [6,7], to efficient real-time (RT) virtualization solutions [8].

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The aforementioned approaches are typically too complex for low-end devices, which are commonly designed for specific tasks, optimized in size, weight, power and cost (SWaP-C), and often constrained by strict RT requirements. ARM recently decided to span TrustZone technology to the new generation of Cortex-M (TrustZone-M) processors and released the Platform Security Architecture (PSA). Since the PSA project is still in a very embryonic stage, it is not particularly focused on exploring reconfigurable platforms to enable the efficient implementation of systems that perfectly fit the heterogeneous nature of IoT applications. Targeting heterogeneous devices, promising approaches such as HaloMote [9], and CUTE Mote [10] were recently introduced, proposing the use of heterogeneous architectures for deploying low-power motes. These heterogeneous solutions explore field-programmable gate array (FPGA) technology to perform computing intensive software tasks (e.g., data aggregation, data compression and high-level radio tasks) in hardware accelerators. Furthermore, they explore low-power operation modes (with very low static energy drain offered by modern FPGA technology) and implement dynamic power management systems, which allow specific node components to be completely shutdown when not in use. Although HaloMote and CUTE Mote implementing promising power optimized architectures, they lack in providing secure primitives for protecting critical data at rest (secure storage) and in processing (secure execution environment).

This work proposes a novel architecture aligned with ARM PSA, anchored by ARM TrustZone-M technology. The established roadmap has identified several important requirements, such as the need for real-time guarantees, secure hardware primitives, efficient power management mechanisms, and full integration of reconfigurable platforms in the ecosystem.

II. CHAMELIOT FRAMEWORK

ARM TrustZone is a hardware technology that adds significant value to the security picture, mainly due to ARM processors being currently the most widely used processors on mobile and embedded segments. ARM TrustZone for Cortex-M microcontrollers provides the same high-level features as used on application processors (Cortex-A); however the underlying operations were re-designed from the scratch, in order to provide faster transitions and greater power efficiency . While TrustZone is a mature technology with huge applicability on high-end devices, TrustZone-M is a complete unexplored area.

Figure 1 depicts the proposed architecture, which is based on a reconfigurable System-on-Chip that integrates, on the same device, a hardcore microcontroller unit (TrustZoneenabled ARM Cortex-M processor) besides a Reconfigurable

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


Figure 1: Architecture overview.

Computing Unit (RCU). The RCU enables the deployment of customized hardware accelerators. Due to the lack of existing solutions with built-in connectivity support, a radio interface must be attached to the mote. Such configuration allows the IoT-enabled OS to properly explore the TrustZone isolation in favor of security, while the RCU can host application-specific or generic accelerators for performance purposes. The use of reconfigurable platforms for offloading to FPGA the computing intensive software is also a new trend in the IoT domain with proven advantages in terms of flexibility, performance and power consumption [11]. Moreover, recent advances on flash-based FPGAs are demonstrating that modern FPGA-based solutions are able to provide a better performance-energy ratio when compared with microcontroller-based solutions.

III. RESEARCH ROADMAP

In order to accomplish the proposed architecture, the following research roadmap is being adopted:

1) Lightweight real-time trusted kernel (LRTTK): Due to the inexistence of a trusted execution environment for low-end devices, we are currently developing a lightweight RT trusted kernel for TrustZone-enabled microprocessors, following a secure by design approach, i.e., using MISRA C coding standard and static analysis tools (i.e., PRQA QA) for code validation. While there are no TrustZone-M platforms available on the market, we got early access to a prototype of a Nuvoton NuMicro M2351. This is, however, on its initial stage of development.

2) Secure architecture: The secure runtime environment (running on the secure world) will be extended with endpoint identity, secure boot process, and a secure update mechanism. These are essential architectural requirements to implement a trustworthy IoT endpoint device. An IoT-enabled OS (e.g., Contiki-OS, RIOT) will be ported to run on the non-secure world, guaranteeing full IP connectivity to the device, while keeping security-critical code completely isolated from noncritical one.

3) Smart power management module: In order to explore new power management techniques, while preventing hacks to power management operations on TrustZone-enabled devices [12], a smart power management module will be implemented. Further studies will be performed in order to investigate how the exploration of low-power modes can potentially compromise security and disregard other system requirements.

4) Reconfigurable hardware accelerators: Intensive computing software tasks will be offloaded to reconfigurable hardware accelerators. Dynamic partially reconfiguration will be also explored in a hardware/software co-design approach.

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